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Building on a new data set which is combined from national micro-data bases, we highlight 
differences in the structure of migrants to four countries, viz. France, Germany, the UK and 
the US, which receive a substantial share of all immigrants to the OECD world. Looking at 
immigrants by source countries, we illustrate the important role of distance, both geographical 
and cultural, immigration policies and migrant networks. Differentiating immigrants by their 
educational attainments, we observe interesting patterns in the skill composition, employment 
opportunities and wages for migrants to the different destination countries. Focusing on 
migration between the four countries in our data set, we find that migration within Western 
Europe is small and rather balanced in terms of skill structures, while there appears to be a 
brain drain from Europe to the US. 
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Why go to France or Germany, if you could as well go to the UK or the US? 




France, Germany, the UK and the US are among the countries that attract most immigrants 
from all over the world.
1 However, the four countries differ strongly in their legal framework 
for immigration. France and Germany have very restrictive immigration policies which, to the 
extent that they are applicable,
2 thus far almost exclusively allow immigration for 
humanitarian reason, including family reunification. Immigration policies in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries are more liberal in general, but rather selective regarding the skills of potential 
migrants.
3 Moreover, France and Germany are characterized by smaller wage dispersion, 
higher unemployment, and a more generous welfare state. Taking these aspects together, the 
Anglo-Saxon countries should attract highly qualified migrants with a strong economic 
potential, whereas France and Germany should be the preferred destination of migrants with 
lower skills and a weaker economic potential – provided they are granted access there. In 
other words, the Anglo-Saxon countries could be on the receiving side of a “brain drain” 
(Johnson 1967; Bhagwati and Hamada 1974), while France and Germany could act as 
“welfare magnets” (Borjas 1994; 1999). 
  Besides the immigration policy and the economic situation in potential destination 
countries, there are other factors that may influence where different types of immigrants go. 
The migration literature states that, first of all, the distance between source and destination 
countries influences the choice of immigrants. Here, distance does not only relate to geo-
graphical proximity but also to cultural links, such as language, customs, or religious beliefs 
(Docquier 2007; Mayda 2007; Pedersen et al. 2004). Another important factor which may in 
fact help to bridge both geographical and cultural distances is the existence of migrant 
networks (Munshi 2003). Many people appear to prefer destination countries where members 
of their family, their home town, or their ethnic group migrated before. To some extent, these 
                                                 
1 Together with Canada and Australia, they receive 77% of all the immigrants to OECD countries (Defoort 
2006). 
2 In France, Germany and the UK, citizens of EU countries who are seeking employment or taking up a job as 
well as those who work as self-employed are subject to free mobility of labour, a basic legal entitlement which 
also applies to their families (Treaty establishing the European Community, 2002, Articles 39-55). This rule has 
been partially suspended during a transition period vis-à-vis the accession countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe that joined the EU in 2004. Until 2005, only the UK has opened the labour market for citizens of these 
countries, while France and Germany did not.  




networks allow migrants to adhere to the culture of their home countries. They also facilitate 
migration as they transmit information about the destination countries and may even give 
people preferential access in spite of legal restrictions, particularly via family reunification. 
  The aim of this paper is to explore, in a purely descriptive fashion, patterns that may 
explain how migrants select into any of the four destination countries we are looking at,
4 
focusing on the following questions: Is migration to a specific country mainly driven by 
factors such as historical links, geographical and/or cultural proximity and migrant networks, 
or are there other (e.g., institutional) determinants as well? Does the structure of immigrants 
differ across our four destination countries, and does it differ from the structure of the native 
populations? Are there any indications of group-specific incentives to migrate to one country 
or another and, in particular, do skill-specific incentives appear to play a role? 
  Using large representative micro-data sets, we analyze whether the distribution of 
migrants over France, Germany, the UK and the US conforms to the factors that are thought 
to have an influence on the choice of destination countries. These data sets are the French 
Enquête Emploi, the German Mikrozensus, the American Community Survey, all for the year 
2005, and the British Labour Force Survey for the first quarter of 2005.
5 Together with the 
native populations, the data cover the current stocks of immigrants living in the four countries 
and provide very detailed information regarding their socio-economic characteristics.
6 
  The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss how immigrants can be 
identified in our data and give a broad overview of the immigrant population in our four 
destination countries. In Section 3, we highlight the role of distance, immigration policies and 
network effects in explaining the distribution of migrants by their countries of origin across 
the destination countries. In Section 4, we take a closer look at the composition of migrants; 
in particular, we study whether specific groups of migrants appear to choose specific 
countries, for instance, whether the UK and the US really attract people with a higher 
economic potential than Germany and France. Section 5 concentrates on the sub-group of 
migrants who move between our four countries. This may shed light on recent discussions of 
whether there is nowadays a “brain drain” between developed countries. Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
4 Similar studies have been conducted by Saint-Paul (2004) for Europeans in the US and by Diehl and Dixon 
(2005) for Germans in the US. 
5 The Enquête Emploi is a 0.5% random survey of the French population, the Mikrozensus a 1% random survey 
of the German population (Scientific use file: 0.7%), the American Community Survey (Ruggles et al. 2007) a 
1% random survey of the US population, and the Labour Force Survey (Office for National Statistics, 2005) a 
0.2% random survey of the British population. The surveys from European countries we are using are all 
channelled into the European Labour Force Survey collected by Eurostat. However, the much larger EU-level 
data set is not available for in-depth research distinguishing immigrants by their home countries. 
6 Note that flow data on current immigrants (and emigrants) are largely lacking any information other than age, 
gender and nationality of the individuals covered. Besides, they are rarely consistent at an international level 
even in terms of the size of in-flows and out-flows.  
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2  Immigrant populations in France, Germany, the UK and the US 
For an analysis of the immigrant population, a precise definition of migrants is needed. In this 
regard, there are two common approaches. One is to classify all people holding the nationality 
of the destination country as natives, and those with a foreign nationality as immigrants. The 
other is to consider all people who were born in the destination country as natives, and those 
who are foreign-born as immigrants. By the first definition, after naturalization an immigrant 
can no longer be distinguished from a native person. Who is a migrant and who is not thus 
depends on national naturalization laws which differ strongly across countries. For instance, it 
is much easier to acquire the American nationality than the German one. Therefore, when 
comparing data for immigrants based on nationality, we cannot really distinguish between the 
effects of migration and naturalization policies. Moreover, by this definition ethnic Germans 
whose ancestors had settled in Eastern Europe centuries ago – the so called (Spät-)Aussiedler 
– are automatically classified as natives when they have moved to Germany, since they are 
entitled to receive the German nationality immediately upon their arrival. 
  However, relying on the country of birth is also far from optimal. This definition does not 
reflect at all different stages of integration into the society of the destination country. Migrants 
can never become natives under this classification, even if they have come to the country in 
their early childhood, have lived there for decades and are perfectly integrated. At the same 
time, people whose mother was more or less coincidentally in the destination country when 
they were born are automatically classified as natives, even though they may not be integrated 
at all. Another, related problem is that children of natives who were born abroad are 
immigrants by this definition. This is mainly relevant for children of members of the armed 
forces who were stationed abroad at the time of birth. As a rule, these children have lived 
abroad only for a few years and should reasonably be considered as natives in their parents’ 
home country. Migration from Germany to the UK is a prominent example for how important 
this group can be: among the 265,000 German-born people living in the UK, only 96,000 do 
not claim to be ethnic British. Fortunately, our data set allows us to identify these individuals. 
  A related question is how to deal with people who actually did not decide themselves 
whether to migrate or not, as they were small children at the time when this decision was 
taken. To circumvent this problem, we focus on individuals who were aged 16 years and older 
when moving to their current country of residence. 
  To illustrate the impact of the different definitions we have discussed here, table 1 gives 
an overview of the numbers of “migrants” aged 18-65 who are living in our four countries 
based on (i) nationality, (ii) country of birth, (iii) country of birth corrected for children of  
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natives, and (iv) additionally restricted to those who were at least 16 when migrating. In 
addition, table 1 displays fundamental labor-market characteristics of natives and immigrants 
such as the respective participation rates, unemployment rates and hourly wages. 
  Table 1 illustrates that the definition of migrants is important. It does not only have an 
impact on the total number of immigrants but also on their composition. A good example is 
given by the Algerian and the Portuguese populations living in France, two of the most 
important immigrant groups in this country. Defining immigrants by nationality (version i), 
the number of people from Portugal is about 382,000 and thus much higher than the number 
of people from Algeria, with about 308,000. However, defining immigrants by their country 
of birth (version ii), the number of people from Algeria becomes about 921,000 – almost 
twice as high as the number of people from Portugal, with about 485,000. Moreover, in the 
case of France the definition also affects the labor-market characteristics. If immigrants are 
defined by country of birth and not by nationality, the participation rate of immigrants is more 
than 2 percentage points higher, the unemployment rate more than 3 percentage points lower, 
and the wage $2 higher. We have already discussed that correcting country-of-birth data for 
children of natives is also important; in the case of France the unemployment rate of 
immigrants is more than 2 percentage points higher after this correction than before. 
Concentrating, in addition, on individuals who migrated when they were aged 16 and above 
does not make a major difference for the structure of immigrants by source countries; 
however, it has a further effect on labor force participation, unemployment rates and wages. 
  Comparing unemployment rates of immigrants in the four countries leads to surprising 
insights. In France, Germany and the UK, unemployment rates of immigrants, regardless of 
their definition, are about twice as high as unemployment rates of natives. However, in the US 
the unemployment rates of the two groups are about the same. The participation rates also 
show an interesting pattern. In Germany, the UK and the US the participation rates of natives 
are all about 77%, while those of immigrants differ between 74% in the US and only 69% in 
Germany and the UK. In France the participation rates of both natives and immigrants are 
lower. As to the average wage of immigrants, it is lower than that of natives in France, 
Germany and the US, the difference being largest in the US. In the UK, however, the average 
wage of immigrants is higher than that of natives.
7 
 
                                                 
7 In order to check whether cohort effects or a different age structure of the immigrant populations are responsi-
ble for these observations, we have additionally looked at the participation and unemployment rates for the age 
group 25-35. As the respective rates are very similar for this more homogenous group to those of the age group 
18-65, we conclude that cohort effects and the composition of migrants cannot explain their different labor-
market performance.   
  
5
Table 1: Immigrants by varying definitions (18-65) 
  (i) 
Nationality 
(ii) 
Country of birth 
(iii) 





As in (iii),  
restricted to indi-
viduals aged >15 
when migrating 
France:     
Natives   35,706,564 33,392,066 34,516,027 
    Participation rate  72.72% 72.92% 72.79% 
    Unemployment rate  9.29% 9.05% 9.05% 
    Wage in $ (PPP) $16.64 $16.57 $16.67 
Immigrants 2,235,731 4,550,229 3,426,268 2,430,072
    Participation rate  64.77% 67.39% 66.81%  64.26%
    Unemployment rate  19.46% 16.00% 18.36%  19.71%
    Wage in $ (PPP) $13.98 $16.03 $14.61  $14.41
Main source countries:    
1. Morocco  316,323 640,116 480,799  347,833
2. Algeria 308,766 921,284 469,593  317,070
3. Portugal 381,540 485,281 474,598  283,625
4. Turkey 143,892 183,472 181,705  134,514
5. Tunisia  108,278 267,470 173,978  138,207
Germany:
a)     
Natives   48,433,295 44,766,025   
    Participation rate  76.35% 76.91%   
    Unemployment rate  10.21% 9.88%   
    Wage in $ (PPP) $16.77 $16.83   
Immigrants 5,533,608 9,200,879    5,648,068
    Participation rate  68.40% 68.85%    70.75%
    Unemployment rate  20.39% 18.05%    19.62%
    Wage in $ (PPP) $15.57 $15.72     $16.00
Main source countries:
b)    
1. Turkey 1,333,512 1,339,737     755,108
2. Russia  258,114 829,751    631,454
3. Poland  239,271 682,191    463,433
4. Italy 500,315 389,075     239,800
5. Serbia and Montenegro 254,335 252,812    171,040
a) Correction for children of natives does not make sense because of the (Spät-)Aussiedler. 
b) Country-of-birth information is not available for all observations. 
Note: While participation and unemployment rates are directly observable, hourly wages are determined as 
described in the appendix.) 
Source: National micro-data sets; authors’ calculations.   
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Table 1 (cont’d.): Immigrants by varying definitions (18-65) 
  (i) 
Nationality 
(ii) 
Country of birth 
(iii) 





As in (iii),  
restricted to indi-
viduals aged >15 
when migrating 
UK:     
Natives 34,608,154 32,803,978 33,528,731 
    Participation rate  77.05% 77.43% 77.46% 
    Unemployment rate  4.00% 3.92% 3.93% 
    Wage in $ (PPP) $20.38 $20.30 $20.37 
Immigrants 2,371,600 4,163,636 3,440,004 2,753,244
    Participation rate  69.26% 69.73% 67.86%  67.82%
    Unemployment rate  8.40% 7.17% 7.88%  7.55%
    Wage in $ (PPP) $21.16 $21.55 $21.00  $20.63
Main source countries:    
1. India  153,081 386,663 362,519  276,253
2. Pakistan  75,851 234,742 233,055  159,898
3. Ireland  248,925 282,213 201,530  148,174
4. South Africa  83,180 163,896 106,399  92,243
5. Poland  92,636 103,656 94,867  93,535
USA:       
Natives 165,305,607 152,192,720 153,664,002 
    Participation rate  77.06% 77.08% 77.12% 
    Unemployment rate  6.51% 6.61% 6.60% 
    Wage in $ (PPP) $23.47 $23.27 $23.28 
Immigrants 17,357,046 29,815,975 28,420,240 22,065,088
    Participation rate  73.12% 74.67% 74.35%  73.78%
    Unemployment rate  7.37% 6.56% 6.59%  6.31%
    Wage in $ (PPP) $17.27 $20.85 $20.64  $20.46
Main source countries:    
1. Mexico  7,240,984 9,446,343 9,330,045  7,112,336
2. India  709,847 1,238,560 1,228,302  1,108,573
3. Philippines 474,521 1,353,701 1,281,424  1,009,079
4. China  458,059 902,680 896,267  796,682
5. El Salvador 646,398 899,033 894,225  707,120
Note: While participation and unemployment rates are directly observable, hourly wages are determined as 
described in the appendix.) 





3  Distance, network effects, and immigration policies 
How do migrants choose their destination countries? If migrants were a homogeneous group 
choosing their destination country only according to the economic conditions in the 
destination country, all migrants should either choose the same destination country, or they 
should evenly disperse across a number of (identical) destination countries. However, none of 
this is what we observe (cf. table 1): The five most important countries of origin strongly 
differ for our four destination countries. Most notably, the numbers of immigrants from India 
and China, by far the two largest countries in the world in terms of population size and 
important source countries of migrants, are negligible in France and Germany, while Indians 
rank first among immigrants to the UK, and Indians as well as Chinese are important groups 
of immigrants to the US. There, however, they are outnumbered by Mexican immigrants by 
factors of 7 to 9. This points to two qualifications of the simple conjecture above: First, 
economic conditions in the destination countries, whether identical or not, are not the only 
determinants of migration. Second, migrants do not constitute a homogeneous group. In this 
chapter, we therefore discuss non-economic factors that help to explain why migrants from 
certain source regions choose certain destination countries. In the next chapter, we will 
analyze in particular whether migrants with different levels of education differ in their choice 
of destination countries. 
 
3.1 Geographical and cultural distance 
One factor which is taken into account in most econometric studies on migration is the 
geographical distance between source and destination countries (see, e.g., Docquier 2007 and 
Pedersen  et al. 2004). The idea behind this is simply that migration costs increase with 
distance.
8 This was certainly true in the past, but with the emergence of new transportation 
and communication networks in the last decades the importance of sheer geographical 
distance may have declined. Our data give no clear picture regarding the importance of 
distance. For France, Germany and the US, it seems to play an important role. Concentrating, 
from here onward, on immigrants in terms of foreign-born people corrected for children of 
natives (version iii in table 1), about 49% of all immigrants to the US come from Canada, 
Central and Caribbean America, with 32% alone from Mexico; 79% of the immigrants to 
Germany (for whom country-of-birth information is available) come from Europe, including 
Russia and Turkey; over 74% of the immigrants to France come from Europe and Northern 
                                                 
8 See Sjaastad (1962) and Carrington et al. (1996) for discussions of migration costs.  
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Africa. In the UK, however, the picture is entirely different. Only 27% of the immigrants 
there come from European countries. 
  Geographical distance can be more or less coincidentally correlated with other factors that 
also have an influence on migration decisions, so that one cannot tell their effects apart. For 
instance, 33% of the French immigrants are from the Maghreb, that is, from countries which 
are not only close to France but also were former colonies. With 60% of the immigrants from 
former colonies, this factor is also important for immigration to the UK; there, however, it is 
not correlated with geographical distance. In Germany, 76% of the immigrants come from 
countries where either (Spät-)Aussiedler or guest workers (who were actively recruited 
between the 1950s and the early 1970s) are from, that is, from Eastern Europe in the former 
case and from Southern Europe in the latter.
9 For immigrants to the US, such additional 
linkages appear to be less important, but at least the large number of immigrants from the 
Philippines is most certainly due to the fact that the Philippines are a former colony. 
  Related to this aspect, the migration literature has developed the concept of cultural 
distance (see, e.g., Docquier et al. 2007). The idea behind this is that integration into a new 
cultural environment is difficult and associated with substantial, though to an important 
degree intangible, costs for migrants. These costs should be higher the more the new 
environment differs from the one they are used to. 
  An important concept used to make the idea of cultural distance operational in the context 
of research on migration is the “linguistic distance”, measured for example by the average 
time people need to learn the foreign language (see, e.g., Chiswick and Miller 2005). An 
obvious approach to testing the importance of this kind of distance would be to look at 
migration flows between countries with the same language. However, virtually all countries 
with the same language also have historical links, in many cases from colonialism, so that the 
effect of language cannot be isolated. Furthermore, there is thus far no reliable concept by 
which the linguistic distance between all pairs of countries could be ranked. Approaching 
other dimensions of cultural distance, such as proximity of religious beliefs, life-styles, etc. 
also leads to measurement problems. Again, countries that are separated by only a small 
distance often have historical ties and a similar cultural environment. In fact, all concepts 
discussed here are potentially important but closely intertwined. 
  Nevertheless, there are two examples in our data where small cultural distance is the most 
convincing explanation for migration flows. One is the high number of immigrants from 
India, Pakistan and South Africa, all former colonies, living in the UK. The other is the 
                                                 
9 Persons for whom no country-of-birth information is available are counted as ethnic Germans.  
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distribution of immigrants from Portugal over France and Germany. In the second half of the 
20
th century, there were large migration flows from Portugal to France; parallel flows to 
Germany were much smaller, even though the Germans were recruiting Portuguese guest 
workers at that time. The geographical distance between Portugal and France is smaller than 
that to Germany, but neither Germany nor France share a common border with Portugal. It 
can thus be assumed that the difference in traveling costs should not be very large. However, 
the Portuguese language is particularly close to French, and social interactions are rather 
similar in these two countries.  
 
3.2 Immigration policy 
Another factor that ought to play an important role for the migrants’ choice of a destination 
country is immigration policy. It determines whether and under what conditions a migrant has 
legal access to a particular country. Immigration policy can also have an effect on the 
expectations that migrants have regarding their life in possible destination countries. A 
common example for the effect of regulations on migration flows is the recent migration from 
Poland to the UK (see Blanchflower and Shadforth 2006; and Drinkwater et al. 2006, for 
discussions). At the time of EU Eastern enlargement in 2004, the UK and Ireland were the 
only countries of the old EU-15 that gave citizens of the new member states free access to 
their labor markets, whereas Germany and France implemented restrictive transitional 
policies. As one would expect, our data indicate that many Polish migrated to the UK shortly 
before and after EU enlargement (see figure 1). However, the data do not show a significant 
decrease in migration from Poland to Germany and France in 2003 and 2004. Thus, it seems 
that the change in British immigration laws has increased total emigration from Poland and 
not just induced a predetermined number of emigrants to go elsewhere. 
  Apart from single instants of policy change that may constitute (quasi-)experimental 
settings, measuring and comparing the strictness of immigration laws across countries is a 
complicated task. To really assess the impact of immigration policy, one would also have to 
consider illegal immigrants, i.e., people who are not observed in official statistics.
10 Note also 
that immigration laws are usually not targeted at people from specific source countries
11 but at 
individuals with specific characteristics, as is the case with family reunification, the US 
“Green Card” or, more recently, point systems based on age, education and job experience as 
                                                 
10 However, in all countries the economic situation of illegal immigrants is by far worse than that of legal ones. 
Hence, as long as economic conditions in possible destination countries are not too different from each other, 
immigrants should always prefer countries where they can legally migrate. 
11 An obvious exception is the differentiation between EU citizens and citizens from “third countries” in 
immigration policies of all EU member states.  
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that introduced in the UK. It is thus rather difficult to get a comprehensive picture of 
immigration laws of a given country and its effects on migrant flows.  
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Source: National micro-data sets; authors’ calculations. 
 
3.3 Migrant networks 
Migrant networks are probably one of the most important determinants of migration. The 
networks consist of members of the same family, the same home town, or the same ethnic 
group (Massey et al. 1993; Munshi 2003). They facilitate migration in various ways. First, 
they offer people who consider migrating detailed information about the destination country. 
This reduces uncertainty and helps potential migrants to save costs. Second, getting legal 
access to a destination country can be easier for those with family ties to others who migrated 
there in the past. Most countries have special rules for family reunification that can give 
access to people who would face immigration restrictions elsewhere. Third, networks may 
offer active support in dealing with practical matters of life in the destination country at an 
early stage of migration, such as finding a place to stay or finding a job. Fourth, large-scale 
networks allow migrants to use their native language and keep their customs in the destination 
country, effectively reducing cultural distance in its many dimensions.  
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Source: German Mikrozensus.  
 
  An interesting example for the importance of networks is given by the migration flows 
from Turkey to Germany. Between 1961 and 1973, Germany actively recruited guest workers 
in Turkey. Although this program was actually meant to be temporary, many of the guest 
workers became permanent immigrants. Since 1973, Germany has a very restrictive 
immigration policy vis-à-vis Turkish people, allowing only family reunification and migration 
for humanitarian reasons.
12 Thus, legal conditions for potential migrants from Turkey to 
Germany changed substantially, and one would expect that immigration had dramatically 
decreased. But in fact, a large share of Turkish immigrants to Germany migrated after 1973 
(see figure 2), and network effects are the most convincing explanation for this. 
  Migrant networks require a critical mass of immigrants from a particular source country, 
or source region. Therefore, in order to fully explain this determinant of migration one also 
has to consider conditions under which the first migrants came to the destination country. 
Short distances, cultural proximity and favorable immigration policies of the destination 
country can lead to a first wave of migration flows. Later on, these first migrants may form 
migrant networks which, in turn, can attract additional migrants from the same source 
countries as they (further) reduce the cultural distance and may even create options to use 
                                                 
12 After the military coup in Turkey in 1980 and during the military conflict in Kurdistan in the second half of 
the 1980s, a large number of Turkish asylum seekers came to Germany.   
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preferential immigration rules. This can be the case even if the initial conditions have changed 
completely since then. As a consequence, network effects can become stronger and stronger 
over time. Once they have been initiated, migration flows in a particular direction may be thus 
self-enforcing.  
  A large part of migration into our four countries can indeed be attributed to networks that 
originate in historical and cultural links, and in specific policy measures. With the exception 
of Poland (rank 5), the ten most important source countries of immigrants to the UK are 
former colonies. Immigrants to France from the Maghreb countries as well as immigrants to 
Germany from guest-worker countries (Turkey, former Yugoslavia, or Italy) or countries with 
many (Spät-)Aussiedler (Russia, Poland, Romania) are nowadays forming strong networks. 
For the US, similar effects may apply to immigrants from the Philippines, as already 
mentioned. Also, the very large immigration flows from Mexico and El Salvador are most 
likely not only caused by the short distance to the US, but also by the emergence of strong 
migrant networks. 
  The role of migrant networks is, at least partly, an economic one, as it is related to a 
reduction of costs and uncertainties. Together with the immigration policy of a destination 
country, it is certainly one of the most important determinants of migration, creating strong 
idiosyncrasies in the composition of immigrants to each country. Our data suggest, however, 
that there may be other factors as well, with a more apparent economic content, that have a 
strong influence on migration decisions. 
 
4  Employment opportunities and skill-specific incentives to migrate 
In addition to controlling for one of the dimensions of distance and potential network effects, 
the migration literature usually emphasizes the role of wages, or wage differentials between 
source countries and destination countries, as well as employment opportunities in the 
destination country, measured for instance through aggregate unemployment rates, as 
important factors for the decision to migrate in a particular direction (see, e.g., Todaro 1969; 
Harris and Todaro 1970). It is important to note, however, that the impact of these factors is in 
all likelihood much more group-specific than the effects of distance, cultural links, and 
network effects.
13 The same may apply to institutional factors, such as labor market 
regulation, taxes and benefits, that we will neglect in this paper.
14 In terms of a descriptive 
                                                 
13 Immigration policies, however, can be targeted both at citizens of specific source countries and at migrants 
with specific characteristics, such as education, professional qualifications or age (see section 4.3 below). 
14 See Geis et al. (2008) for an empirical analysis which builds on the same data set as the present paper and adds 
data on national-level institutions to explain migrants’ choices among different destination countries.  
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analysis, an important and highly interesting dimension of the structure of migrants living in 
the four destination countries is their skill composition. We will therefore look at this aspect 
more closely, taking into account in particular how migrants’ skills relate to their employment 
opportunities and wages in different countries.
  
 
4.1. Skill composition of migrants 
The idea that high-skilled and low-skilled individuals face different economic incentives to 
migrate is at the core of the well known application of the Roy model to immigration (Roy 
1951; Borjas 1987). This model states that, in a two-country setting in which both countries 
are equal except for their wage dispersion, high-skilled people will migrate from the country 
with the lower wage dispersion to the one with the higher wage dispersion, while low-skilled 
people move in the opposite direction. In a multi-country setting, high-skilled and low-skilled 
migrants will ceteris paribus choose those destination countries which offer them the highest 
wages. In addition to wages, skill-specific employment opportunities as well as institutional 
factors may further contribute to differentiate incentives to migrate to a particular country by 
the level of skills of the potential migrants. 
  To what extent do migrants with different skill levels really choose different destination 
countries? To address this question, we need a consistent measure of skills. Assuming that the 
skill level of an individual is determined by, or at least highly correlated with, educational 
attainments, it can be measured by the highest educational degree obtained. To rank 
educational degrees of various kinds, we use the International Standard Classification of 
Education (ISCED), a classification which was developed by the UNESCO (1997) to allow 
for international comparisons of educational degrees. For the German data we use an algo-
rithm proposed by Schrödter et al. (2006); for the US data we apply the mapping between 
years of schooling and ISCED levels provided in Institute for Education Sciences (2007); for 
the British data our re-classification follows the LFS User Guide (2007) with two devia-
tions;
15 the French data already contain education levels in the ISCED classification. 
  Here, we do not use all ISCED levels, but condense them into four educational groups: no 
secondary educational attainment (ISCED 0-1), lower secondary educational attainment 
(ISCED 2), upper secondary and postsecondary non-tertiary educational attainment (ISCED 
                                                 
15 First, we classify people who state to have been in school but have not acquired any formal degree as ISCED 
1, not as ISCED 2. Second, we do not classify all people who state to have “other qualifications” as ISCED 3, 
but assign them the median ISCED level of people with the same age and the same (last) occupation. For this we 
use the SOC (Standard Occupational Classification) 2000 unit-level classification which distinguishes between 
353 different occupations. An assignment of education levels is necessary, as most foreign degrees are recorded 
as “other qualification” in the British LFS.  
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3-4), and tertiary educational attainment (ISCED 5-6). A major reason is that differentiations 
between ISCED 3 and 4 and between ISCED 5 and 6 are hardly comparable across countries. 
Table 2 gives an overview of the skill structure of immigrants to our four destination countries 
based on these groups, also comparing it to the skill structure of the native populations. We 
now focus on individuals between 25 and 54 years, as these people are generally part of the 
labor force. 
 
Table 2: Immigrants aged 25-54 by skill groups 
  France Germany 
  Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants 
ISCED 0-1         
Number  1,613,090 699,323 368,143 718,828
Share  7.13% 28.56% 1.24% 11.70%
Share of immigrants   30.24%     66.13%
Participation rate  74.75% 67.98% 68.14% 60.36%
Unemployment rate  13.18% 19.15% 29.47% 26.86%
Wage  $12.87 $12.91 $9.61 $13.51
ISCED 2         
Number  4,478,207 512,363 3,003,786 1,596,041
Share  19.78% 20.92% 10.14% 25.97%
Share of immigrants   10.27%     34.70%
Participation rate  84.92% 76.05% 79.40% 75.08%
Unemployment rate  12.10% 21.55% 18.42% 20.65%
Wage  $14.44 $13.22 $13.31 $13.42
ISCED 3-4         
Number  10,167,941 701,190 17,763,323 2,547,618
Share  44.92% 28.63% 59.95% 41.45%
Share of immigrants   6.45%     12.54%
Participation rate  90.00% 81.39% 88.62% 84.46%
Unemployment rate  6.90% 17.19% 9.87% 15.56%
Wage  $15.32 $14.23 $15.30 $14.71
ISCED 5-6         
Number  6,375,285 535,926 8,490,608 1,282,602
Share  28.17% 21.89% 28.66% 20.87%
Share of immigrants   7.75%     13.12%
Participation rate  91.67% 80.90% 90.61% 81.55%
Unemployment rate  5.45% 15.81% 3.92% 12.69%
Wage  $20.86 $19.56 $20.87 $20.02
Total         
Number  22,634,522 2,448,802 29,628,916 6,145,765
Share of immigrants   9.76%     17.18%
Participation rate  88.38% 76.34% 88.00% 78.60%
Unemployment rate  7.84% 18.28% 9.09% 17.22%
Wage  $16.65 $14.85 $16.86 $15.52
Note: Immigrants are defined as in version iii in table 1. Hourly wages are derived as described in the appendix. 




Table 2 (cont’d.): Immigrants aged 25-54 by skill groups 
   UK US 
    Natives Immigrants Natives Immigrants 
ISCED 0-1         
Number  2,590,481 509,257 1,667,184 3,884,751
Share  11.92% 19.89% 1.63% 18.27%
Share of immigrants   16.43%     69.97%
Participation rate  61.94% 49.95% 51.41% 73.25%
Unemployment rate  6.98% 9.25% 13.33% 7.99%
Wage  $14.17 $12.47 $14.24 $11.39
ISCED 2         
Number  3,905,006 305,096 7,655,447 2,659,406
Share  17.96% 11.92% 7.47% 12.51%
Share of immigrants   7.25%     25.78%
Participation rate  82.30% 78.99% 67.58% 74.26%
Unemployment rate  4.27% 7.65% 14.63% 7.80%
Wage  $15.99 $15.98 $14.13 $12.84
ISCED 3-4         
Number  8,428,241 880,387 53,448,746 7,583,786
Share  38.77% 34.38% 52.18% 35.67%
Share of immigrants   9.46%     12.43%
Participation rate  88.44% 84.08% 81.64% 78.40%
Unemployment rate  2.78% 5.65% 6.39% 6.26%
Wage  $18.60 $19.77 $18.75 $16.38
ISCED 5-6         
Number  6,736,941 715,139 39,661,288 7,132,580
Share  30.99% 27.93% 38.72% 33.55%
Share of immigrants   9.60%     15.24%
Participation rate  93.08% 87.75% 87.84% 81.23%
Unemployment rate  1.81% 5.43% 3.01% 4.24%
Wage  $25.87 $26.16 $30.68 $30.08
Total         
Number  21,739,180 2,560,563 102,432,665 21,260,523
Share of immigrants   10.54%     17.19%
Participation rate  85.34% 73.34% 82.50% 77.89%
Unemployment rate  3.11% 7.02% 5.57% 6.04%
Wage  $20.40 $20.63 $23.44 $20.05
Note: Immigrants are defined as in version iii in table 1. Hourly wages are derived as described in the appendix. 
Source: National micro-data sets; authors’ calculations. 
 
According to table 2, our data support the idea that the Anglo-Saxon countries attract 
highly qualified migrants, whereas Germany and France attract low-skilled ones. Among all 
immigrants aged 25-54, 34% have a tertiary degree (ISCED 5-6) in the US and 28% in the 
UK. In France and Germany, this share is substantially lower, with 22% and 21%, 
respectively. However, the share of natives with a tertiary degree is also much higher in the 
US (39%) and still higher in the UK (31%) than in France (28%) and Germany (29%). Up to a 
point, this general observation still holds if we apply a broader skill measure. Considering the 
shares of all migrants with at least an upper secondary degree (ISCED 3-6), we find that 69%  
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of the immigrants in the US, 62% in Germany and the UK, but only 50% in France belong to 
this group. It should be noted, by the way, that in the UK only 69% of the native population 
aged 25-54 have at least an upper secondary degree, while 73% of the French, 89% of the 
German and even 91% of the US native population do. Relative to natives, the educational 
level of immigrants is thus by far the highest in the UK. 
  In some cases, the skill structure of migrants also differs remarkably by source countries. 
Probably the most prominent example is given by the US. Table 3 (upper panel) shows that 
there are enormous differences in the educational levels of immigrants from Mexico, from 
Canada and other Latin American countries, and from all other countries. 38% of the 
immigrants from Mexico do not have a secondary educational degree (ISCED 0-1), while the 
same holds for less than 5% of the migrants from “other countries”. On the other hand, only 
8% of the immigrants from Mexico have a tertiary degree (ISCED 5-6), in contrast to 57% of 
the people from other countries. Keeping in mind that 34% of all immigrants to the US come 
from Mexico and 43% from “other countries”, this shows that the immigrant population is 
very heterogeneous. In Europe, these differences are by far smaller, and the immigrant 
population is more homogeneous. Nevertheless, there is some variation in the skill structure 
of various sub-groups of immigrants also there, immigrants from Turkey and other countries 
to Germany offering a good example. Only 5% of the people from Turkey have a tertiary 
degree, while more than 23% of the people from other countries do (see table 3, lower panel). 
 
Table 3: Immigrants to the USA and Germany aged 25-54, by skill groups 
ISCED 0-1  ISCED 2  ISCED 3-4  ISCED 5-6  Total  Share 
Immigrants from…  USA 
2,689,265 1,495,480 2,384,069 554,930 7,123,744  33.5% Mexico 
37.8% 21.0% 33.5% 7.8% 100.0%   
766,029 667,339 2,223,289 1,367,519 5,024,176  23.6% Canada and other 
Latin America  15.2% 13.3% 44.3% 27.2% 100.0%   
429,457 496,587 2,976,428 5,210,131 9,112,603  42.9% Other countries 
4.7% 5.4% 32.7% 57.2% 100.0%   
1,667,184 7,655,447 53,448,746 39,661,288 102,432,665    Natives 
1.6% 7.5% 52.2% 38.7% 100.0%   
  Germany 
301,201 404,875 238,452 49,387 993,915  16.3% Turkey 
30.3% 40.7% 24.0% 5.0% 100.0%   
417,280 1,186,661 2,291,732 1,224,032 5,119,705  83.7% Other countries 
8.2% 23.2% 44.8% 23.9% 100.0%   
368,143 3,003,786 17,763,323 8,490,608 29,625,860    Natives 
1.2% 10.1% 60.0% 28.7% 100.0%   




4.2 Employment opportunities and wages by skill groups 
Employment opportunities for natives and immigrants are usually far from equal. In addition, 
this difference also varies by educational levels, yet with substantial variation across our four 
destination countries (see, again, table 2). In the US, the unemployment rate of immigrants 
aged 25-54 with lower skills (ISCED 0-2) is 6 percentage points lower than the one of natives 
in the same skill groups. In Germany and the UK, the rate is 3 percentage points higher, and 
in France it is 8 percentage points higher. At the same time, the participation rate of 
immigrants with lower skills is higher in the US than in Europe, whereas participation rates of 
natives in the same skill groups are clearly higher in (continental) Europe than they are in the 
US. This indicates that low-skilled immigrants are much better integrated in the US labor 
market than in the European ones.  
  The unemployment rate of immigrants with high skills (ISCED 5-6) relatively to the one 
of natives in the same skill group is again lowest in the US. There, it is higher by a factor of 
about 1.4; the corresponding figure for France is about 2.9, for the UK about 3.0 and for 
Germany about 3.2. Taking into account that participation rates in this group are about 81% in 
Germany, France and the US and 88% in the UK, these numbers indicate that for highly 
qualified immigrants it appears to be much easier to enter the American labor market than the 
German and French one.  
  Comparing wages at an international level is difficult in general, and it is certainly not 
facilitated by our use of data sets from differing sources. In an appendix to this paper, we 
describe the procedures we applied to extract a rough, but meaningful, measure of wages per 
hour. Our wage data indicate that, except for high-skilled immigrants (ISCED 5-6), wages of 
immigrants are much lower than those of natives in the US, whereas in the European 
countries wages of immigrants and natives are similar. This could be the reason why the 
unemployment rate in the US is lower for immigrants than for natives and higher in the 
European countries. Given the nature of our wage data, it is unfortunately not possible to 
compare the precise degree of wage dispersion across our four destination countries. Using 
simple measures, the dispersion of hourly wages appears to be a lot wider in the US than in 
the European countries, and still somewhat wider in the UK than in France and Germany.
16 
However, the result for the US may be exaggerated by the way we constructed our wage data. 
  Educational attainments are not the only measure for the level of skills of migrants, as 
skills are not only reflected in formal qualifications, but also relate to motivation and, in 
particular, entrepreneurship (see Saint-Paul 2004). An alternative approach to measuring the 
                                                 
16 For instance, the Gini coefficient of our measure of wages per hour is 0.423 for the US, 0.441 for the UK, 
0.457 for France, and 0.458 for Germany.  
  
18
skills of migrants, based on their willingness to take on economic risks, could thus be to look 
at the shares of self-employed individuals among them. Legal rules for self-employment are 
different in our four destination countries, so that direct cross-country comparisons of these 
shares may not be appropriate. Table 4 therefore also displays the immigrants-to-natives ratios 
of self-employment for individuals aged 25-54 in each country. Self-employment is more 
wide-spread among immigrants than it is among natives in France, the UK and the US, while 
in Germany the share of immigrants who are self-employed is lower than that of natives. 
 
Table 4: Share of self-employment in total employment, individuals aged 25-54 
  France Germany UK US 
Natives  9.4% 11.5% 12.5% 10.0%
Immigrants  10.3% 10.7% 14.7% 10.8%
Immigrants/Natives  1.09 0.93 1.18 1.08
Source: National micro-data sets; authors’ calculations. 
 
4.3 Skill-specific immigration programs 
Besides skill-specific employment opportunities and wages in the destination country, there 
are also preferential immigration rules for high-skilled people that we have neglected so far, 
such as the “Highly Skilled Migrant Programme” (HSMP) in the UK, the “H1B visa” in the 
US and the German “Green Card” for IT specialists (Zaletel 2006). To show the effects of 
group-specific immigration policies, the British HSMP is most interesting. This program was 
launched in January 2002, without any preceding scheme of a similar type. It gives people 
access to the UK regardless of a specific job offer if they reach a certain score based on their 
qualifications and experience. To see whether this program has been effective in any way, we 
plot the numbers of all immigrants aged 18-65 to the UK by year of arrival and educational 
level in figure 3. The figure indicates that immigration of individuals holding tertiary degrees 
(ISCED5-6) has not increased after 2001, while immigration of those with an upper and post-
secondary degree (ISCED3-4) has continued to go up substantially. This means that the 
HSMP did not have much effect on its most important target group. However, it is not 
unlikely that discussions about this program and its implementation had a signaling effect for 
persons with intermediate skills, thus stimulating their immigration. 
  In the US, selective immigration policies have been rather successful, except for the 
effects on immigration from its neighboring countries. As we have already seen in table 3 
(upper panel), the share of individuals aged 25-54 with a tertiary degree (ISCED 5-6) who 
came from countries other than Canady and Latin America is extremely high, at 57%.  
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Conversely, the share of immigrants from these countries without an upper secondary 
education (ISCED 0-2) is very low, at 10%. Failure to reach similarly favorable results vis-à-
vis Mexico and other source countries in North, Central and Caribbean America is mainly due 
to family reunification rules which offer an alternative route for a significant number of 
people in each year for getting access to the US without any skill-specific selection. Overall, 
our data nevertheless indicate that, so far, there is a difference between the US and Europe, 
not so much between the Anglo-Saxon countries and the continental European ones, regarding 
the effectiveness of selective migration policies. 
 














Source: British Labour Force Survey; authors’ calculations. 
 
4.4 Summary 
Now, what do these results tell us about the group-specific determinants of migration? First of 
all, France and Germany appear to be relatively unattractive for highly-educated migrants, as 
the unemployment rate of immigrants with a tertiary educational degree (16% and 13%, 
respectively) is enormous in these countries and wages are significantly lower than in the UK 
and the US. Thus, it is not surprising that the shares of high-skilled immigrants are much 
higher in the UK and the US than in continental Europe. Second, across all skill groups our 
data show an interesting pattern: On the one hand, immigrants earn lower wages than natives 
in the US, whereas in the European countries the earnings are similar for both groups. On the  
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other hand, in the European countries immigrants are much more likely to become 
unemployed than natives, whereas this is not the case in the US. In a sense, both high-skilled 
and low-skilled immigrants appear to be better integrated in the US labor market than they are 
in Europe. Last but not least, regardless of whether our destination countries are actively 
attempting to select immigrants by skills on a larger scale or not, none of them appears to be 
very successful in attracting mainly high-skilled migrants. 
 
5  Migration between the four destination countries 
An interesting feature of our data set is that it also allows for a description of migration 
between our four destination countries. In this respect, we are able to contribute some insights 
to recent discussions of whether, in the context of globalization and increasing mobility of all 
factors of production, there is nowadays a brain drain and, on the receiving side, a brain gain 
between advanced economies (Saint-Paul 2004). 
  Table 5 gives an overview of gross migration between the four countries, differentiated by 
skill levels. Since all of the countries we are looking at are highly developed countries, these 
mutual flows are basically modest. In particular, the numbers of low-skilled migrants are very 
small, so that we aggregate low educational degrees to ISCED 0-2. As there are still only 
10,000 individuals or less in most of the cells that result, one should be a bit cautious when 
interpreting these numbers. For comparison, the table also confronts the skill structure of 
migrants from one country to another with the skill structure of the residents in the source 
country as well as in the destination country to see whether there are any disproportions on 
either side.
17  
  Table 5 shows that much more people have migrated from the European countries to the 
US than the other way round. Within Europe the differences are much smaller. Nevertheless, 
there are clearly more people from France and the UK who live in Germany than people from 
Germany living in France and the UK.
18 As the same holds for high-skilled persons (ISCED 
5-6), Germany appears to benefit from the skill structure of migration within Europe, although 
on a small scale only. France appears to lose in this game, in terms of total migration and 
high-skilled migrants, vis-à-vis the other two European countries. All in all however, there is 
no indication that intra-European migration has a notable impact on the skill structure of both 
source and destination countries. 
                                                 
17 Note that, in our rough classification of skill levels, migration could be beneficial (detrimental) for both sides 
if net migration mainly takes place in the intermediate skill group and the sending country has a large share of 
high-skilled individuals, while the receiving country has a large share of low-skilled individuals (or vice versa). 
18 Note that this crucially depends on the definition of immigrants. For instance, if one does not exclude the 
children of armed forces, then more people from Germany live in the UK than people from the UK in Germany.  
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Table 5: Migrants between the four countries aged 25-54 
  ... to France  ... to Germany  ... to the UK  ... to the US 
From France…        
ISCED 0-2 (in brackets: share of total)    7,367  (11.2%) 6,006  (10.6%)  2,053   (2.7%)
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country    0.12% 0.03%  0.03%
… in the destination country    0.22% 0.09%  0.02%
ISCED 3-4 (in brackets: share of total)    22,761  (34.6%) 28,165  (49.6%) 19,630    (25.5%)
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country    0.22% 0.28%  0.19%
… in the destination country    0.13% 0.33%  0.04%
ISCED 5-6 (in brackets: share of total)    35,689  (54.2%) 22,629  (39.8%) 55,408    (71.9%)
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country    0.56% 0.35%  0.87%
… in the destination country    0.42% 0.34%  0.14%
Total    65,817   (100%) 56,800   (100%)  77,091   (100%)
From Germany        
ISCED 0-2 (in brackets: share of total)  7,375  (15.1%) 2,363   (7.0%)  10,886   (5.0%)
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country  0.22% 0.07%  0.32%
… in the destination country  0.12% 0.04%  0.12%
ISCED 3-4 (in brackets: share of total)  21,135  (43.3%) 16,089  (47.9%)  92,151  (42.5%)
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country  0.12% 0.09%  0.52%
… in the destination country  0.21% 0.19%  0.17%
ISCED 5-6 (in brackets: share of total)  20,351  (41.7%) 15,157  (45.1%)  113,912  (52.5%)
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country  0.24% 0.18%  1.34%
… in the destination country  0.32% 0.22%  0.29%
Total  48,861   (100%) 33,609   (100%)  216,949   (100%)
From the UK        
ISCED 0-2 (in brackets: share of total)  3,755  (10.1%) 6,569  (11.7%)   9,282  (2.8%)
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country  0.06% 0.10%   0.15%
… in the destination country  0.06% 0.19%   0.10%
ISCED 3-4 (in brackets: share of total)  12,833  (34.4%) 20,098  (35.8%)   121,502  (37.2%)
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country  0.15% 0.24%   1.44%
… in the destination country  0.13% 0.11%   0.23%
ISCED 5-6 (in brackets: share of total)  20,733  (55.6%) 29,481  (52.5%)   195,607  (59.9%)
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country  0.31% 0.44%   2.90%
… in the destination country  0.33% 0.35%   0.49%
Total  37,321   (100%) 56,147   (100%)   326,391   (100%)
From the US        
ISCED 0-2 (in brackets: share of total)  1,933  (17.8%) 9,752  (13.2%) 6,385  (11.0%)   
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country  0.02% 0.10% 0.07%   
… in the destination country  0.03% 0.29% 0.10%   
ISCED 3-4 (in brackets: share of total)  151   (1.4%) 25,817  (35.0%) 29,941  (51.5%)   
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country  0.00% 0.05% 0.06%   
… in the destination country  0.00% 0.15% 0.36%   
ISCED 5-6 (in brackets: share of total)  8,788  (80.8%) 38,177  (51.8%) 21,771  (37.5%)   
%  of ISCED group    
… in the source country  0.02% 0.10% 0.05%   
… in the destination country  0.14% 0.45% 0.32%   
Total  10,872   (100%) 73,747   (100%) 58,097   (100%)   
Source: National micro-data sets; authors’ calculations.  
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  Things are different with regard to migration between Europe and the US. First of all, we 
observe that migration from the UK and Germany to the US is substantial, amounting to 1.5% 
and 0.7% of the population in the source countries, respectively.
19 At the same time, 
migration from the European countries to the US is clearly biased towards high-skilled 
individuals. Focusing on this sub-group of the population, emigration to the US amounts to 
2.9% for the UK, 1.3% for Germany, and 0.9% for France. There is clearly less of a skill bias 
in migration from the US to Europe, and total numbers of migrants are much smaller. 
  











ISCED 0-2 ISCED 3+4 ISCED 5+6 Total
Net emigration (% of the European populations)
Net immigration (% of the US population)
  
Source: National micro-data sets; authors’ calculations. 
 
  To assess whether there is really a brain drain or brain gain, respectively, involved in 
migration from one country or region to another, one should of course look at net migration. 
High-skilled individuals could be more mobile than low-skilled ones in general, which would 
explain a skill bias in gross migration, while there is simply some “brain exchange” going on 
after consolidating these numbers. To investigate this point more carefully, we now combine 
the figures for the three large European countries in our data set and look at the structure of 
the resulting net migration to the US (cf. figure 4). On both sides, the skill structure of the 
                                                 
19 The corresponding figure for France is only 0.3%. Note that these figures are not included in table 5. – See 
Uebelmesser (2006) for an in-depth analysis of the characteristics of Germans thinking about emigration.  
 –    +    –     +    –     +    –     +    
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population would be unaffected if net migration were balanced for each skill group or if net 
migration increased, or reduced, each skill group by the same percentage. In other words, the 
profile of the columns included in figure 4 would have to be flat for a given country or region, 
either at the horizontal axis, above or below it.
20 According to our definition, the European 
countries taken together indeed suffer from a brain drain vis-à-vis the US. While net migration 
is almost balanced for the low-skilled, there has been considerable net migration of high-
skilled people out from Europe. This brain drain is clearly the strongest for the UK, but it is 
also relevant for Germany and France. For the US, there is thus a brain gain vis-à-vis the 
European countries, but it appears to be less pronounced due to the different skill structure of 
the US population (and due to the larger working-age population in general). 
  These numbers quite probably overstate the current brain drain from Europe to the US, as 
a large share of our observations migrated to the US years ago. Nevertheless, they indicate 
that the US is particularly attractive for high-skilled Europeans, much more so than Europe is 
for high-skilled Americans. Beyond the fact that high-skilled individuals are generally more 
mobile than low-skilled, selective immigration policy in the US may also play a role for 
strengthening the skill pattern of net migration. 
 
6 Conclusions 
Our data provide interesting insights into the structure and, most notably, the skill 
composition of migrants. Regarding the latter aspect, we find clear differences between 
France, Germany, the UK and the US. The share of high-skilled immigrants (ISCED 5-6) in 
the US is by far higher than that in any of the three European countries, the share of high-
skilled immigrants in the UK being still more than 6 percentage points higher than those in 
Germany and France. The share of qualified immigrants in total (ISCED 3-6) is also highest 
in the US, followed by the UK and Germany, with equal rates, and then by France. Migration 
between the European countries is low and basically balanced, whereas we observe a brain 
drain from the European countries, especially from the UK, to the US.  
  It is also interesting to note that immigrants to the US in general perform better than 
natives in terms of employment, while immigrants to the European countries do worse. 
Comparing wages of immigrants and natives, we find that wages of immigrants, except for 
high-skilled ones, are much lower than those of natives in the US, whereas the difference is 
much smaller in the European countries. This indicates that labor market frictions in Europe 
                                                 
20 One may discuss whether a net in-flow (out-flow) of high-skilled individuals is not beneficial (detrimental) 
anyway, as they are usually more scarce than the low-skilled throughout the world.  
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lead to higher wages and, at the same time, to higher unemployment rates for immigrants. 
When discussing incentives to migrate, one should thus probably not only distinguish 
between Anglo-Saxon countries and continental Europe, but also between Europe and the US. 
  In themselves, our data cannot give a comprehensive picture of the reasons why people 
migrate. However, we do find some interesting features. Large immigration flows from 
Central and Caribbean America to the US are best explained by the low distance. However, in 
the UK immigrants from European countries make up only a small portion of the immigrant 
population. The main reasons, it appears, are the cultural links between the UK and its former 
colonies and the resulting migration networks. These networks are probably one driving force 
for migration to a particular destination country. They substantially reduce the cost of 
migration and thus, in spite of long distances and legal barriers, strongly influence the 
attractiveness of a destination country. Networks could actually have a stronger effect than the 
economic situation in the destination countries. 
  Bearing this in mind, disentangling the role of factors other than distance, culture and 
networks for migrants’ choices of destination countries is nevertheless important. The reason 
is that, in addition to immigration policies that are becoming more and more selective 
regarding the skill composition of migrants, there may be other determinants which have an 
impact on these choices and can be influenced by political decisions in countries that seek to 
attract migrants. In the present paper, we have used our rich data-set which is combined from 
different national micro-data sets for purely descriptive purposes. The next step is to exploit it 
for econometric analyses, controlling for aspects such as network effects and employment 
opportunities and wages, but putting a special emphasis on further – in particular, institutional 
– determinants which have not been much investigated to date. In a twin paper (Geis et al. 
2008), we follow this route with an empirical study of the differential effects of (institutional) 
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Appendix: Calculation of hourly wages 
The information on wages provided in our four data sets is actually not comparable. 
Nevertheless, to derive a rough measure for hourly gross wages, we proceed as follows: In a 
first step, we calculate wages per hour using information on wage earnings and working hours 
contained in all datasets. As our German dataset actually contains income and not wage data, 
we consider only persons stating to have no other income than wages. In a next step, we 
calculate wages for all the sub-groups we consider in more detail (cf. tables 1 and 2), relative 
to average wages in the country. In the last step, we multiply these relative wages with data on 
GDP per capita from OECD (2007b). We cannot directly compare our intermediate results 
regarding wages per hour, as for the European countries we observe net wages, while for the 
US we observe gross wages. Note that this means that the dispersion of our wage measure for 
the US is probably exaggerated compared to that in the European countries. Still, we think our 
measure of wages is superior to the (uniform) GDP per capita which is used in many other 
studies on the determinants of migration (see, e.g., Pedersen et al. 2005; Mayda 2007; 
Docquier et al. 2007). CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
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